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STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced by stipulated decree in March, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 48. The 
parties have two children, C.B. born in 2002 (age 12) and B.B., born in 2005 (age 8Yz), who 
were always in the primary care of their mother, who is a homemaker. 
The parties' decree contains a specific provision providing a 1 00-mile radius of 
father's ranch near Sweet, Idaho, outside of which moves with the children require mutual 
agreement or court order. R. Vol. I, p. 59. 
The children's father, Defendant Jeff Biggers (hereinafter "Jeff') filed for custody, 
claiming that a "sudden" move with the children by Plaintiff Emily Suter (hereinafter 
"Emily"), was wrongful, even though within the 100-mile allowance. R. Vol. II, p. 253. 
Emily, a stay-home mom, and the kids' primary custodian, did move with her husband and 
four children, to Lake Fork, south of McCall, from a ranch property outside Emmett, at the 
end of May, 2013, when the kids finished school in Emmett. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
There have been extensive post-divorce proceedings between these parties, including 
multiple motions to modifY, motions for contempt, and related proceedings. But their original 
divorce was entered by stipulation, in March, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 46. 
Emily, always a stay-at-home mom, received primary custody of C.B. and B. B. in the 
agreed divorce, and Jeff received alternating-weekend visitation, plus two nights during the 
week, plus extended summer periods and holidays, although the decree provides for joint legal 
and physical custody. R. Vol. I, pp. 48-63. 
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During their marriage, both parties said they around considerably, living in the Boise, 
Canyon, Gem and Valley County areas; the kids attended several different schools between 
Kindergarten and sixth grade for C.B., and Kindergarten and third grade for B.B., moving 
among schools in Sweet, Horseshoe Bend and Emmett. Tr. Vol I, pp. 103-1 04; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 
235-237; Tr. Vol. II, p. 341, 1. 1-9. 
After the divorce in 2011, Emily and the kids moved to a ranch acreage her family 
owned at Letha, which is just west of Emmett, and the kids attended schools in Emmett 
proper. Tr. Vol. I, p. 91, 11. 10-12; Tr. Vol. II, p. 378, 1. 24-p. 380, 1. 25. Jeff remained at the 
large secluded ranch owned by his father, on Brownlee Road, above Sweet, which is actually 
in Boise County. R. Vol. I, p. 91 (Exhibit B-2 of Order ModifYing Decree of Divorce, entered 
by agreement in October, 2011); Tr. Vol. II, pp. 234-235; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 362-363. That's 
where the parties lived at the time of the original divorce, and the reason the divorce was 
originally filed in Boise County. 
The parties' stipulated divorce decree contains the following provision: 
10. RELOCATIONBYPARENT 
We agree that a move by either parent of more than 100 miles from 
Sweet, ID 83670 will make this plan impractical or unworkable. Therefore, 
neither parent will make such a move with a child without our mutual 
agreement or a decision by the court that it is in the child's best interest to 
move. 
Decree ofDivorce entered Mar. 29,2011, Exh. A. (Amended Parenting Plan), R. Vol. I, p. 59. 
In May 2012, Emily filed a modification action (hereinafter "20 12 Modification"), 
asking to relocate the children with her to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, beyond the 100 mile limit 
stated in the divorce decree, primarily for improved employment opportunities for her 
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husband. R. Vol. I, pp. 93-100. Jeff opposed any move, and after a trial in Idaho City (Boise 
County), Emily's request was denied, but Emily retained primary custody, and Jeff's visitation 
was actually reduced, to four nights a month (two weekends) plus a summer block and holiday 
time. R. Vol. I, pp. 135-139. The magistrate who heard that matter (Hon. Roger Cockerille) 
found that Jeff's behavior toward Emily had been "harassing and intimidating" (R. Vol. I, p. 
137); Emily had "always been the primary caregiver of the children" (R. p. 137); and Jeff's 
conduct had been "foolish and immature" towards Clint Suter, the children's step-father (R. p. 
138). Although not allowing the children to move outside the 100 mile limit set in the original 
divorce, the court reduced Jeff's visitation to just four overnights a month during the school 
year and significantly increased his child support. R. p. 148 and R. p. 166. The court 
specifically left all other provisions of the original decree intact, including the 100 mile 
provision. R. p. 148. 
Almost immediately (3 months later), Jeff filed a modification petition asking to 
reduce his child support. R. p. 171, Petition for Modification filed March 21, 2013. Emily 
answered and counterclaimed for clarification ofthe holiday and summer schedule. R. Vol. II, 
pp. 232-234. Jeff had also filed contempt against Emily based on a conflict between the 
holiday schedule and the weekend schedule. 
Jeff then sought and was granted a change of venue to Gem County in April2013. 
R. Vol. II, p. 249. The case was transferred to the Third Judicial District. R. Vol. II, pp. 232-
238. 
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While Jeff's original modification was pending, Emily and her husband moved their 
residence (at the end of May 2013) to Lake Fork Gust south ofMcCall), well within the 100 
mile limit from Sweet designated in the custody decree. Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, ll. 7-16. 
Jeff then amended his modification action to seek primary custody based on Emily's 
move. R. Vo. II. pp. 331-333. In June, Jeff also filed multiple counts of contempt against 
Emily for alleged violations of the custody order, including specifically for "moving from the 
area with the parties' children ... in violation of the Court's decree ... entered March 29, 
2011." R.Vol.II,p.261. 
Later, on August 16, 2013,just before school started in McCall, Jeff filed for 
temporary orders, seeking temporary custody because he wanted the kids to go to school in 
Emmett. R. Vol. II, p. 269. 
Emily responded that the children had been living in Lake Fork for several months by 
that time, and were looking forward to school there, and she had been exchanging the children 
at Smith's Ferry all summer without incident, which was only 8 miles further from Jeff's 
house than the previous exchange point they'd used when the kids lived in Letha. R. Vol. II, 
p. 289-293. 
The court, based only on the affidavit of Jeff's attorney (R. Vol. II, pp. 271-274) and 
argument, entered temporary orders which required the children to be re-enrolled back in 
Emmett, while continuing Emily's primary custody. R. Vol. II, pp. 343-344. 
Trial was then held on Jeff's modification over a two-day period (November 21, 2013 
and January 9, 2014). The court bifurcated the evidence and first heard Jeff's contempt 
motion. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 7-74. The court dismissed all of Jeff's counts of contempt except for 
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one part of his "count 4" for failing to provide a specific address to Jeff. Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, ll 
11-24.1 
The trial concluded on January 9, 2014, and the court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on January 28,2014. R. Vol. III, pp. 404-415. A "Third Modified 
Decree" was entered February 10, 2014, and Emily applied for an order allowing permissive 
appeal on February 11, 2014. An order allowing permissive appeal was entered by the 
magistrate March 10,2014. R. Vol. III, p. 441. Timely request was made to the Supreme 
Court pursuant to Rule 11 (8)(2) Idaho Appellant Rules, for an Order Granting Motion for 
Acceptance of Permissive Appeal, which motion was granted April2, 2014. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Emily and Jeffs two children (hereinafter "the boys") are ages 12 and 8. C.B. just 
finished 6th grade, and B.B.just finished 3rd grade. Tr. Vol. I, p. 104,11. 1-3. Before the 
parties' divorced in 2011, C.B. has started school in Sweet (kindergarten) and then went to 
Horseshoe Bend for a year or so. B.B. started school in Sweet as well, before changing to 
elementary school in Emmett. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 103-104. The parties had always moved around. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 340, L. 15-p. 341, L. 9. 
1 In its ruling on the contempts, the court specifically dismissed Jeff's claim that Emily's 
move with the children had violated the custody order. Tr. Vol. I, p. 65, L 23-p. 66, L. 6. The Court 
stated: 
Specifically, there's been no evidence whatsoever that moving to McCall is 
over 100 miles away from Sweet so I will go ahead and dismiss Count 3 at this time 
on a Rule 29 motion. 
Count 4, I will strike relocating with the parties' children. There's been, 
again, no evidence that that is contrary to the Court's decree of divorce because 
there's been no testimony or evidence as to the distance between Sweet and McCall. 
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The parties had specifically contemplated moves of the children within a specific 
radius (100 miles) of Jeff's family's mountain ranch, likely due to the rural nature of the entire 
area. R. Vol. I, pp. 48-63. Their decree provides: 
10. RELOCATION BY PARENT 
We agree that a move by either parent of more than 100 miles from 
Sweet, ID 83670 will make this plan impractical or unworkable. Therefore, 
neither parent will make such a move with a child without our mutual 
agreement or a decision by the court that it is in the child's best interest to 
move. We agree that a new parent plan will be made if a moves occurs. 
Decree of Divorce entered Mar. 29, 2011, Exh. A. (Amended Parenting Plan), R. p. 59. 
In April2013, Emily and her husband, Clint Suter, were looking for alternatives to 
staying in Letha, just west ofEmmett. Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, 11. 7-16. They had asked to be able to 
move to distances beyond the 100-mile limit in the decree, which Jeff had consistently refused 
to consider, and which had been declined in the prior modification request in 2013. R. Vol. I, 
p. 135-139. 
Their main motivation was to enable Clint, Emily's husband, to find employment 
closer to home instead ofhaving to commute to North Dakota. Tr. Vol. II, p. 314,11. 17-22; 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 319,11. 12-16. In the McCall area, Clint was able to find full-time employment 
at Brundage Mountain Resort, which provides significant benefits, such as full medical 
insurance for the family including dental and vision. Tr. Vol. II, p. 303, L. 21-p. 304, L. 18. 
Prior to that time last year, the children had no had medical insurance. Jeff testified he didn't 
have it and paid "with cash" for health care. Tr. Vol. II, p. 361, L. 22-p. 362, L. 5. 
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Clint's income allows Emily to continue as a full-time homemaker and care provider 
to her family a role she's had since C.B. and B.B. were born. Tr. Vol. II, p. 305,11. 11-15; 
p. 368, L. 21-p. 369, L. 4. 
Jeff, on the other hand, who is provided his home on his father's ranch property (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 362, 11. 15-16) testified that he prefers not to work (he has an excavation business), 
so he can stay at the ranch and "spend more time with my kids." Tr. Vol. II, p. 363, 11. 1-6. 
He admitted he's not paid for "helping on the ranch" but prefers being there. He testified he 
can take the time to drive the 25-30 miles one-way to Emmett to see the boys at school 
regularly during the work days. Tr. Vol. II, p. 120, 11. 3-6; Tr. Vol. II, p. 234, 11. 11-17; Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 205, L. 17-p. 206, L. 22. 
There was testimony that, in fact, Jeff is able to regularly go visit the boys at their 
respective schools during the week, despite the fact that his actual visitation under the custody 
order only gives him two weekends a month (Tr. Vol. I, p. 188, 11. 1-5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 133, L. 
22-p. 134, L. 12; p. 139, 11. 11-18), and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
by Judge Cockerille on October 24, 2012, specifically found: "It is in the children's best 
interests to eliminate mid-week visitation altogether." R. Vol. I, p. 139. 
One of Jeffs chief objections to the boys going to school in McCall was the "great 
inconvenience" of having to drive further to visit the boys during the school week when they 
would be in Emily's custody. Tr. Vol. II, p. 399, 11. 19-25; Tr. Vol. II, p. 205,11. 17-23; 
p. 208, 11. 4-9. He also testified it would be a "lot ofhardship" to drive to McCall for parent-
teacher conferences or to go on field trips. Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, 11. 3-9. The testimony 
established that the McCall schools were about 80 miles from Jeffs parents' ranch, whereas 
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the Emmett schools are between 20 and 30 miles from the ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 205, 11. 17-23; 
p. 234, L. 6-p. 235, L. 5. 
Jeff admitted that his actual court-allotted visitation was only 4 days a month, and his 
agreed-on exchange point for pickups and drop offs of the boys had gone from 20 miles to 28 
miles- a difference of about 8 miles. Tr. Vol. II, p. 234, L. 17-p. 235, L. 5; p. 396, L. 12-
p. 397, L. 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 115,11. 4-11. 
Emily's Exhibit 217, admitted into evidence, showed the approximate distances and 
the similarity between the travel from Jeffs ranch outside Horseshoe Bend to the prior 
exchange place near Emmett (20 miles) and the new exchange the parties used at Smith's 
Ferry (28 miles), after May, 2013. Tr. Vol. II, p. 396, L. 9. 
Both parents testified they believed the boys were basically bright students (C.B. was 
described as an excellent student). Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, 1. 17-23. There had been some issues 
with C.B. 's mid-term grades, which Emily described, as partly owing to the transition to 
junior high, and the introduction ofhomework. Tr. Vol. I, p. 111, ll. 12-p. 114, L. 5; 
Plaintiffs Exh. 201; Defendant's Exhibits C and D; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21, ll. 8-16. 
In support of her decision to move to the McCall area, Emily testified she felt the 
divorce decree permitted her to move the children there, as it was within the 1 00-mile radius 
of Sweet Idaho, near Jeffs ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 367, ll. 3-11. She testified at length about 
doing careful research about the quality of schools in McCall, compared to Emmett, and what 
she felt were superior ratings and test scores in McCall. Tr. Vol. II, p. 374, 11. 3-12. 
Jeff testified at length primarily that the boys had friends at school and loved doing 
ranch activities, on Dad's weekends and in the summer, such as calf branding, rodeo events, 
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horse back riding, and working with animals. Tr. Vol. I, p. 174,11. 20-21; p. 181, L. 83; Defs 
Exh. AA, BB, CC and DD. 
Jeff testified that if the boys went to school in McCall, they would lose their 
friendships with the kids in Emmett, but the mother of the kids' closest friend testified her son 
Tristan had gone to church camp with C.B. and B.B. in McCall for almost 2 weeks after 
they'd moved there, and had a great time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 290, 11. 17-25; Tr. Vol. II, p. 232, 11. 
5-17. 
There was no expert testimony of any kind presented. A McCall police officer did 
testifY how close his own kids had become to C.B. and B.B., from being neighbors of Emily 
and Clint in Lake Fork. A school resource officer from McCall testified that he'd had C.B. in 
his scout troop during the summer and how great a kid he is. Tr. Vol. II, p. 329, 11. 6-17. He 
also testified that the McCall schools "rate very high" and his own kids were excited to attend 
school and church with C.B. and B.B. Tr. Vol. II, p. 336, 11. 1-18. 
As a result of the court's temporary order in August 2013, however, Emily was 
required to re-enroll the kids back in the Emmett schools, despite having lived in Lake Fork 
for several months by that time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 402, L. 17-p. 403, L. 14. To comply with the 
order, she lived "out of a suitcase" at her parents' home in northwest Boise, during the school 
weeks, and returned to their home in Lake Fork each weekend, when the kids didn't go to their 
father's ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 403,11. 11-12. Her parents' residence, at 11431 West Hickory 
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Loop, in northwest Boise, is about the same distance to Emmett as Jeff's parents' ranch on 
Brownlee Road in Boise County. Tr. Vol. I, p. 155,11. 9-11; Tr. Vol. II, p. 272,11. 1-2.2 
The magistrate bifurcated the contempt and the modification trials, but stated the court 
would consider all the contempt evidence as applicable to the modification. At several stages 
of the proceeding, the magistrate, seemed to go back and forth- viewing the case as a 
"relocation" case, and then at other times applying the 1 00-mile move provision in the original 
decree. Tr. Vol. I, p. 195, 11. 13-14 (For example, at the end of the first day oftrial, the Court 
stated: "[R]elocation and transition is the ultimate issue for this Court's consideration."); Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 65, L. 23-p. 66, L. 6 (However, in dismissing Jeff's contempts based on the move, 
the court said: "Specifically, there's been no evidence whatsoever that moving to McCall is 
over 100 miles away from Sweet so I will go ahead and dismiss Count 3 [of the contempt] at 
this time on a Rule 29 motion. Count 4, I will strike relocating with the parties' children. 
There's been, again, no evidence that this is contrary to the Court's Decree of Divorce because 
there's been no testimony or evidence as to the distance between Sweet and McCall") 
The court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 28, 2014. R. 
Vol. III, pp. 404-420. Despite having earlier found that Emily had the right to move the 
children to Lake Fork (as it was clearly within the 100-mile radius of Sweet), the trial court 
terminated her primary custody and switched the children's primary custody to Jeff "at the 
ranch" and directed that the children "continue to attend school in the Emmett school district" 
2 Brownlee Road is the mountain road that starts north of Sweet (in Gem County) and comes 
out at Gardena at Highway 55, just north of Horseshoe Bend. By that route, the ranch property is only 
about 12 miles from Horseshoe Bend; ifyou go down to Highway 52, its still only 14 miles to 
Horseshoe Bend, compared to 20 miles to Emmett from the ranch. See, Plaintiff's Exh. 217, Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 396, L. 10.) 
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despite the evidence that the ranch property (in Boise County) where Jeff lives is a 40-mile 
daily round trip on mostly narrow mountain roads to the Emmett Schools the kids had been 
attending. R. Vol. III, p. 416. The court also limited Emily's time to two weekends a month, 
which was the schedule Jeff had received at the prior modification, despite the fact that neither 
party had asked for her to be so limited and Jeff's pleadings had requested she have alternating 
weekends. R. Vol. III, p. 416. 
The trial court does not address or discuss at all the impact or significance of the "1 00-
mile" provision in the parties' original custody decree, but finds that Emily's move to live in 
McCall constituted a "material, permanent and substantial change" because: 
"it is to a different city, county, and school district, and because Emily's move 
impacts the current visitation schedule by changing the exchange location, lenthening 
the commute time of the parties for the exchange, and impacts Jeffs not scheduled 
visitation with the boys." 
R., Vol. III, p. 411 (emphasis added). 
The court identified nothing even faintly negative about Emily's character or integrity, 
found no abuse of any kind toward the children, found that "the boys have thrived under 
[Emily's] custodial arrangement, finding stability in a structured and predictable visitation 
routine ... The boys have formed strong bonds with their half siblings, Mr. Suter [step-dad], 
[and] his children ... " R. Vol. III, p. 412. The court finds that, despite the boys' "strong 
bonds" with their siblings in Emily's home, "a change is [sic] primary custody will not 
significantly impact those relationships." R. Vol. III, p. 414. The Court finds: 
"There is no evidence that the boys' enthusiasm at being big brothers will diminish if 
they do not primarily reside in McCall ... Under the [new] schedule, the boys will be 
able to build upon these relationships during camping trips and family outings in the 
summer months, as they did in the summer of2013, as well as scheduled weekend 
visits to McCall." 
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R. Vol. III, p. 414. 
The trial court thus dismissed the established and successful primary custody exercised 
by Emily, as of little weight compared to the importance ofthe boys' "historic ties to the 
Emmett community." Id, at p. 413. There was no question that Jeff has a large extended 
family, many of whom live in rural Gem and Boise County according to the evidence, and that 
during his past summers, weekends and holidays, Jeff and his family do rodeos, brandings, 
and "all the activities that Idaho ranch life has to offer" with the children. Id 
But there was no testimony or evidence whatsoever to suggest that the kids' access to 
these activities would actually diminish, because all witnesses' testimony about these events 
were referring to times spent with the kids during Jeffs actual court-ordered parenting time. 
Jeffs entire case at trial was to show it was going to be harder for him to go to the kid's 
schools and school activities during Emily's custodial time if they were in McCall. See, e.g., 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 208-209. Yet, despite this record that the only change from the kids going to 
Lake Fork was a slightly longer commute to the exchange place for Jeff, the trial court 
concluded: 
Should the boys primary residence be McCall during the school year, such constant 
and continual contact with Jeff outside of the custodian agreement would diminish due 
to distance, logistics, and practicality. The move is not in the boys' best interest at is 
[sic] would negatively impact their relationship with their father ... [T]he boys have 
historically participated in several milestone events in the ranching community in the 
Emmett area. The boys attend cattle brandings at various ranches in the Emmett area 
with Jeff in the spring and participate in the cattleman's rodeo in early September. 
Should the boys' primary residence be McCall, they would attend school in McCall. 
The boys' ability to attend and actively participate in these Emmett area community 
events that occur during the school year would be negatively impacted. As such, the 
move is not in the boys' interest as it would negatively impact their historic ties to the 
Emmett community." 
R. Vol. III, p. 413 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the trial court placed significant weight on the children's attendance and 
participation in 'ranch events' connected to Jeffs life, all of which had occurred historically 
during his custodial time under the prior orders, and on the children's continued attendance of 
school in Emmett, despite the fact that Jeffs Boise County ranch property cannot be regarded 
as "close" to the former schools in Emmett-although it's somewhat closer than Emily's 
home in Valley county. Id From Jeff's house, it's still at least a 40-mile round trip every day 
for the kids to their schools, but the trial court makes no mention of that. 
Rather, the trial court analyzed the case solely as a "relocation" and found that Emily 
had not met a burden to show that relocation of the boys to Lake Fork was in their best 
interests: "This Court finds that it is not in the boys' best interests to move to McCall, Idaho." 
R. Vol. III, pp. 411-412,416. 
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IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The trial court entered temporary orders requiring Emily to return the children 
to Emmett schools, despite their move to Lake Fork, but entered no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law regarding the best interests of the children, and received no evidence 
supporting the temporary order other than an affidavit of counsel. 
2. At trial, the Magistrate recognized Emily's right under the existing divorce 
decree to move with the children within 100 miles of Sweet, Idaho, but then imposed a 
relocation burden ofproofunder Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 64 P.3d 327 (2003), to 
conclude the "move to McCall" is "not in the boys' best interests." 
3. The trial court didn't consider all relevant factors when it changed primary 
custody in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
This is a direct appeal from decisions of the magistrate court changing primary 
residential custody of two children. In a review of discretionary custody decisions, the 
Supreme Court directly reviews the record before the trial court in determining if the trial 
court 1) correctly perceived the issues as discretionary; 2) acted within the outer boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it; and 
3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 187 P.3d 
1234 (2008). 
The Court further reviews the trial court's findings of fact, and will uphold them if 
they are supported by substantial, competent evidence. !d. 
II. THE TEMPORARY ORDERS WERE INCONSISTENT 
WITH IDAHO LAW 
The trial court's temporary orders, entered in August 2013, required Emily to return 
the children to Emmett schools for the fall term pending trial. R. Vol. II, p. 343. Those orders 
were inconsistent with Idaho law. 
In Idaho, orders regarding custody are submitted to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and will be overturned only if there is an abuse of that discretion. However, a lack of 
any findings of fact, or conclusions of law, or any references to evidence supporting the 
court's exercise of discretion, as in this case, is not indicative of a sound exercise of 
discretion. Schultz, supra, 145 Idaho at 863. 
After Emily moved in May, 2013 to Lake Fork with the boys, they agreed to a new 
exchange spot for transfers, and continued sharing parenting time back and forth under the 
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existing order without incident.3 Just before school was to start for the boys, however, Jeff 
filed a motion for temporary orders. R. Vol. II, p. 268-284. He sought temporary custody for 
himself, intending to re-enroll the kids in Emmett schools. !d. But the only evidence in 
support of Jeffs motion was an affidavit ofhis attorney, Tim Fleming, which attached letters 
between counsel, and earlier findings and conclusions entered in the 2012 modification action 
by Judge Cockerille. R. Vol. II, pp. 275-284. 
Emily filed an extensive Affidavit in Opposition, however, pointing out that her 
residence was within the provisions of the parties' divorce decree which allowed her 
specifically to move with the boys within the 1 00-mile radius of Sweet, the connections which 
the boys had established in the McCall area over the three months there, their activities in Boy 
Scouts, Church, Library programs, and football camp, at their new home, that she had inquired 
about the kids continuing to attend in Emmett and had been turned down, that she had enrolled 
them in McCall for school, and noting the kids' closeness to their half-siblings, Taylor (age 
17), and Bridger (age one). R. Vol. II, pp. 290-292. Emily also pointed out that the exchange 
location for Jeffs exercise of his parenting time had only changed by 8 miles from the prior 
exchange location. !d. 
3The new exchange spot was only 8 additional miles for Jeffto drive from his ranch, 
going the long way through Horseshoe Bend; there's a short way down to Highway 55 from 
his place which comes out at Gardena, and saves 8-1 0 miles, meaning the distance is about the 
same as he'd been driving before to get the kids a Black Canyon Dam. Tr. Vol II, p. 234, L. 
21; Tr. Vol. II, p. 396, L. 12-p. 397, L. 9. The evidence at trial, and Emily's affidavit in opposition 
to the temporary orders motion, showed that the parties had readily adjusted to the new exchange 
spot-Smith's Ferry-and they'd followed the existing order without incident over that summer. R., 
Vol. II, p. 290-292 (Affidavit of Emily Suter); Tr. Vol. II, pp. 406-408; Plaintiffs Exhibit 215. 
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After a brief telephone conference hearing, the trial court entered an "Order Re: 
Temporary Orders" dated August 23, 2013, which directed that the children be "immediately 
enrolled in and attend school in Emmett..." and "shall reside with the [Emily] in the Emmett 
area while they attend school ... "unless otherwise agreed by Jeff. R. Vol. II, pp. 333-334. 
The same day, after an Objection was filed by Emily, R. Vol. II, pp. 336-337, the court entered 
an "Amended Temporary Order" which stated the same requirements for immediate school 
enrollment, but removed the requirement of the children residing with Emily "in the Emmett 
area." R. Vol. II, pp. 343-344. 
As in the Schultz case, the trial court's bare order contains no reasoning or authority, 
and no indication that the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, or analyzed the issue 
regarding temporary custody in a manner consistent with Idaho Code Section 32-717. There, 
the trial court had entered a similar temporary order, requiring a party who had left the state to 
return or give up custody, without analysis or discussion other than a case citation. On appeal 
the Court observes: 
'"An abuse of discretion by the trial court occurs when the evidence is insufficient to 
support its conclusion that the welfare and interests of a child will be best served by a 
particular custody award."' [citations] It is also an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to over emphasize any one factor. [citation] All of the relevant factors 
impacting the custody decision must be considered and reflected in the record." 
Schultz, supra, 145 Idaho 863, 187 P.3d 1238. 
Here, the trial court seemed to place sole emphasis on the fact that the children had 
attended school in Emmett, and that appears to be the only factor considered. No mention is 
made of the custody decree's language which specifically permitted movement of the children 
within a 1 00-mile radius of Sweet, Idaho. No mention is made of the minimal impact on the 
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father's commute (an eight-mile increase) to exchange the children. The temporary order is 
not consistent with Idaho law as an abuse of discretion as it was unsupported by any record, 
and was not the result of any reasoned analysis, and resulted from solely considering only one 
factor-the children's prior school enrollment. 
This is not a case where a parent has taken a child away out of state in violation of 
another parent's custodial rights or claims, as was the case in Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 
624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007). In Hopper, the Court found the trial court to have abused its 
discretion at the time of the temporary order hearing by allowing a parent to retain custody out 
of state in violation ofldaho's criminal statutes. Here, the reverse has occurred, but its equally 
flawed. The trial court refused to allow a parent to continue her lawful custody at her lawful 
residence in McCall where she had moved with the children in a manner consistent with the 
agreed custody orders in place at the time.4 The result is Emily was forced to live "out of a 
suitcase" with her parents in Boise, while communting her children to Emmett for school 
during an entire fall semester.5 
4 The record does not reflect the existence of any injuntion or other temporary 'status quo' 
order which would have prevented Emily from moving the children in May, 2013. As the record 
makes clear, Jeff tried to hold Emily in contempt at trial for her McCall move, and this was explicitly 
rejected by the trial court, saying essentially that Emily had the right to do what she did with the 
children in May 2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, ll. 2-6 ("There's been, again, no evidence that that [move to 
McCall with the kids] is contrary to the Court's decree of divorce ... ") 
5 In its findings and conclusions, the trial court expressed frustration that Emily had not 
moved back to Emmett, or hadn't simply voluntarily relinquished custody to Jeff. The trial court 
criticized Emily for doing what the temporary order forced her to do: "Instead of remaining within the 
Emmett School District or permitting the boys to reside with Jeff during the week to ensure the minor 
children maintain the current enrollment, Emily and the boys have been residing in her parents'. 
basement in Boise, and transporting the minor children to school in Emmett on a daily basis." Finding 
#13, R. Vol. III, p. 406-407. Plaintiff's Exh. 217, admitted at trial, showed that the distance was about 
the same to get to Emmett, whether the kids were in northwest Boise with Emily, or at the Boise 
County ranch property where Jeff lives. 
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The temporary order was an abuse of the trial court's discretion and inconsistent with 
Idaho law. 
III. THIS IS NOT A RELOCATION CASE: THERE HAS 
BEEN NO MOVE IN VIOLATION OF A PRIOR 
CUSTODY ORDER 
At trial, the Magistrate recognized Emily's right under the existing divorce decree to 
move with the children within 100 miles of Sweet, Idaho, but then imposed a relocation 
burden of proof under Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 64 P.3d 327 (2003), to conclude the 
"move to McCall" is "not in the boys' best interests." This is not consistent with Idaho law. 
The trial court cited to Roberts, but appears to have misapplied its lesson. The court in 
Roberts specifically held that "when moving the minor children would violate an existing 
custody arrangment, the parent seeking permission to relocate with minor children has the 
burden of proving that the relocation is in the best interests of the minor children." 13 8 Idaho 
at 405, 654 P .3d at 331. Here, Emily's move was not in violation of "an existing custody 
arrangement" but in fact was recognized as being consistent with the existing orders. Yet, the 
trial court does not discuss this issue at all. 
Because there was no burden under the law on Emily to prove that the move to McCall 
was in the kids' best interests, the trial court's imposition on Emily of such a burden was 
improper. It was Jeffs burden to show that changing custody to him, under all the 
circumstances of the case, was in the kids' best interests. All that Jeff (who is self-employed 
on his family's ranch and apparently has no "boss" or set schedule) introduced was testimony 
that it would be marginally more difficult for him to drive to the kids' schools if they're 80 
miles away instead of20 miles away. But the record was clear that his court-ordered time was 
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not impacted at all other than by an additional eight miles to go to the exchange place of 
Smith's Ferry (compared to Black Canyon Dam), and it would be equivalent distance if he 
takes the shortest route down to Gardena. So, since there's no more than a deminimus impact 
on Jeff's actual custodial time because of the move, the trial court looks almost entirely at the 
impact on Jeff's ability to spend time when it was not his allocated time under the custody 
orders. 
Jeff presented evidence that the kids enjoyed many of the 'ranching activities' which 
the trial court noted, and that they were active in 4-H, boy scouts, church, rodeos, and sports. 
But Emily's evidence showed clearly that the boys had the same opportunities, and interest, in 
church, boy scouts, 4-H, and sports, up in Valley County, to the same if not a greater degree 
than in Gem County. Tr. Vol. I, p. 109, L. 22-23; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 379-381. The trial court 
doesn't identifY any distinguishing characteristics of the activities in Gem County to make 
them 'better' other than that the kids had done them longer. Again and again, the trial court 
comes back to the kids' perceived "historic ties to the Emmett community." R. Vol. III, p. 413. 
But the reality of the court's decision, preferring a parent who is a 40-mile- round-trip outside 
"the Emmett community" as better than their established custodian and primary parent in 
McCall reflects a determination to regard "the move" as the central and primary factor in this 
case. 
Because Emily's move was not 'in violation of a previous custody arrangement'-and 
in fact the trial court found it was not a violation- applying a burden on Emily to prove the 
move in isolation was in the children's best interests, was error. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS UNDER IDAHO 
CODE 32-717 WAS FLAWED 
The trial court overemphasized the factor of the move and the kids' perceived benefits 
from staying in school in Emmett, Idaho. It also failed to consider several of the factors of 
Idaho Code Section 32-717. 
As discussed above, the trial court focused almost entirely on the perceived benefits of 
attending school in Emmet, Idaho for these kids. There was no evidence of such a benefit, 
compared to McCall schools, other than familiarity. Indeed, the court itself notes that "there's 
no evidence of what, if any, educational opportunities are available to the boys in McCall that 
are not in Emmett." R. Vol. III, p. 415. But this means the court was looking solely for 
whether there was a specific benefit to the change-and that's rarely the case. What the law 
requires is looking at the broad picture and all the factors. 
'"This Court has previously held that Idaho law does not impose a presumption against 
relocation. [Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,457, 197 P.3d 310,318 (2008)] "'On the 
contrary, when considered together, [previous cases] stand for the proposition that a 
magistrate must consider all factors relevant to the child's best interest when making a 
custody determination. A parent's move is only one factor to be considered when 
awarding custody." !d. "An overemphasis on any single factor is also an abuse of 
discretion." !d. at 458, 197 P.3d at 319. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318,324,281 P.3d 1096, 1102 (2012). 
The Peterson case is instructive here, as is Markwood v. Markwood, 152 Idaho 756, 
274 P.3d 1271 (Ct App 2012). In Peterson, the trial court allowed a relocation of children out 
of state, and the other parent appealed. The Court, as shown by the above quote, made clear 
that a move is but one of the many factors to be considered by a trial court. In Markwood, the 
facts are similar to the present case. The trial court there had a case before it which involved a 
mother in Moscow, and father some 30 miles away, in Clarkston, Washington. The mother 
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moved to central Oregon and wished to move the children there, as she was the established 
custodian. The trial court correctly percived the issues and was quoted by the Court of 
Appeals: 
"The ideal situation ... was maybe [Amber] staying in Moscow. [The children] were 
very well-adjusted here. They love Moscow. They love their friends here. That's not 
the case that I get to decide. I have a very different case. That's not- that's not the case 
I- that's not the choice I get to make." 
Markwood, Id, at 760. 
In the present matter, the trial court did not correctly perceive the issue and focused 
entirely on one factor-the move. The trial court here made its decision based on where the 
children's friends are, where their school was, and changed custody to a parent who lives 
only slightly closer to those friends and schools, but still a signficant distance away almost 
as if the Markwood magistrate had decided to switch custody to the father in Washington 
state, and told him to keep the kids in school in Moscow. 
Here, as well, the trial court did not consider two of the key factors under Idaho Code 
32-717. The trial court focused almost entirely on "(d) The child's adjustment to his or her 
horne, school, and community" and "(f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the 
life of the child." Idaho Code 32-717. The trial court engaged in virtually no discussion at all 
or consideration of two other key factors: "(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the 
child with his or her parent or parents, and his or her siblings" and "(e) The character and 
circumstances of all individuals involved." The court's only examination of the sibling and 
family relationships was to find that the kids were closely bonded with their siblings in their 
mother's horne, but that only seeing them for 4 days a month in the future "will not 
significantly impact those relationships." R. Vol. III, p. 414. Moreover, the court's decision is 
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devoid of discussion of factor (e), the parties' character and circumstances. Much 
documentary evidence was presented of the often hateful text messages which Jeff 
periodically unloads on Emily, and her efforts to respond. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Exhibit 212; 
Defendant's Exhibit A. Judge Cockerille, in the parties' previous litigation, explicitly called 
Jeffs behavior toward Emily "harassing and intimidating" (R. Vol. I, p. 137), while finding 
that Emily had "always been the primary caregiver of the children" (R. p. 137) and Jeffs 
conduct had been "foolish and immature" toward her. This factor was never discussed by the 
trial court here, and the decision reflects this lack of balance. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court's decision should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for proceedings to return the children to their established primary parent, Emily 
Suter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ay of June, 2014. 
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